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THE ENCOMIENDA IN NEW MEXICO, 1598-1680

H. ALLEN ANDERSON

ON A FAIR SPRING DAY in early May 1598 a band of Spanish soldiers
and colonists reached the ford of the Rio Grande at EI Paso del
Norte. Here they paused as their leader, don Juan de Onate, formally took possession of the province of New Mexico for Spain"in
the name of God, the Church, and the Crown." With him were
129 soldiers, some of them with families; 83 wagons, and some
7,000 head of livestock. The clergymen in the group included ten
Franciscan friars, eight secular priests, and two lay brothers. 1 The
progress of this relatively small band of colonists up the Rio Grande
Valley was slow and painful, but by the end of the year, Onate had
obtained outward agreements of submission from the caciques of
all the major Indian pueblos. 2 With the advent of these first Spanish
colonists came many important changes in the natives' lifestyles,
including Christianity, metal tools, gunpowder, wheat, and livestock, especially horses. Equally important in affecting Pueblo society was the introduction of a peculiar social and political institution
characteristic of Spain's colonial policy, the encomienda.
The encomienda system, rooted in the med~eval Castilian custom
of "commendation," was .begun in the West Indies by Columbus,
carried to the mainland by Cortes in his conquest of Mexico, and
grafted onto the already-extant structures of native government
that the conquistadores quickly fOUI~d useful. 3 In essence, the system allotted .conquered lands aJ;1d the peoples on it to those who
had participated in the conquest. Since these lands th.eoretically
came under the king's royal patronage, the monarch could do with
them as he desired. Encomienda,. then, was a crude for~ of serfdom, adapted to fit the exigl:!ncies of Spain's New World empire.
Its main purpose was threefold: 1) to reward the builders of the
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empire and their heirs for one or more generations; 2) to encourage
settlement and ensure a colony's permanence by requiring the
proprietor, or encomendero, to live near his area of encomienda;
and 3) to provide for the defense of the area and its inhabitants.
In addition, New World encomiendas also entailed obligations to
instruct the Indians in the Roman Catholic faith and the rudiments
of Spanish civilization. 4
The term "encomienda," particularly in New Spain (Mexico), was
most commonly used to designate portions of Indians living on the
allotted lands. The granting of encomiendas carried with them the
right of reparlimiento, that is, the right to employ Indians living
on the grants. Although the religious motive of Christianizing the
Indians was stressed, the economic motive of securing a cheap
labor supply to maintain the colonists and increase their wealth
was foremost in the minds of the encomenderos. Indian labor was
deemed necessary, especially for work in mines and on farms,
because the class of colonists could or would not work with their
hands. 6 As an answer to the crown's demand for tribute, the system
allowed the encomenderos the products of Indian labor, collectable
either in personal service or material tribute. Unlike medieval serfs,
who were vassals of proprietors, Indians in encomienda were direct, free vassals of the crown, as had been the poor and conquered
peoples in Castile and Leon. Legally they were not attached to the
soil, but were instead allowed to move about freely. They also had
legal protection against abuses of their statutory rights. Since the
system had no juridical connection with land, encomenderos had
no administrative or judicial authority. They were forbidden to live
in the Indian towns (pueblos) or to own property within them. 7
Because of the system's quasi-feudal overtones, Indians in encomienda were, despite laws protecting their rights, from the beginning subject to abuses. This abuse was particularly true in the
formative years when encomenderos sought to gain perpetual rights
of lordship over their vassals. The encomienda essentially fostered
the structure of a fighting class, a praying class, and a mass of
laborers to do' most of the menial tasks. Although Spanish colonists
were divided between the "haves" and the "have-nots," the latter
being at a disadvantage in the scramble for wealth and status, their
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problems were trivial compared to those of Indians allotted to
ruthless proprietors. 8
Almost from the start the crown, in the interest of royal absolution, sought to control the system, fearing that otherwise the
New World, like the Peninsula, would be fragmented among powerful feudal barons. At the same time, reports of abuses sparked
an outcry for reform from Bartolome de las Casas and other clerics.
Consequently debate over reforms went on for years in the courts
of Emperor Charles V. This controversy culminated in the passage
of the so-called "New Laws" in 1542, under which the enslaving of
Indian captives was forbidden, and only governors could levy tribute from newly discovered natives. Since requirement of personal
service was prohibited, encomenderos could thenceforth collect
only the fixed tribute in kind specified by their grants. 9
Quite naturally, conquistadores and their successors raised a flurry
of protest. Even some of the clerical orders and prelates in the
colonies defended the encomienda. The latter's argument was that
they needed their own grants of Indian labor in order to exist, plus
they feared that lay encomenderos would rise up in arms against
the reforms. In 1545 the emperor bowed to pressure to let the
encomiendas continue. This move proved a serious reversal to
Indian rights as well as the crown's attempts to centralize Spanish
polity. Although laws against cruelty and slavery remained on the
books, practice on remote frontiers often deviated from the king's
principles. 10
Continuing concern about abuses led to the crown's eventual
suspension of conquests until a more just method of conducting
them could be devised. In 1573 Philip II passed a new ordinance
by which "pacification" by peaceful, not forceful, means was to be
used. Indians who voluntarily submitted to vassalage and Roman
Catholicism would be heaped with advantages, and recalcitrants
were to be dealt with diplomatically, using as little force as possible. 11 From that time on, this law embodied the governing principles of Spanish conquest, even though some individuals considered
it permissible to use force against "infidels." The key principle was
the incorporation of Indians into Hispanic colonial society.12 As
conquistadores .opened one new region after another for settlement, the encomienda became the Spaniards' chief recourse of
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securing an adequate manual labor supply. Don Antonio de Mendoza, New Spain's first viceroy, made several such grants to individuals, among them don Francisco Vasquez de Coronado. In turn,
as governor of Nueva Galicia, Coronado made similar grants withih
his jurisdiction. Any. effort by the crown to eliminate the encomienda was unsuccessful, and the system continued throughout
much of the seventeenth century, particularly in more isolated
areas. 13
It was this system that Juan de Onate, son of the co-founder of
the Zacatecas silver lodes and himself a distinguished military officer, wanted to carry into the distant, as yet unsettled, province
of New Mexico. In his contract of 1595, made under the terms of
the law of1573 with Viceroy don Luis de Velasco, Onate was granted
the title of adelantado, a combination of governor and captaingeneral. He was also authorized to award encomiendas to the soldiers and settlers who participated with him in the province's pacification, good for three generations. These settlers were to be given
land and enobled as hidalgos. 14 As governor of the colony, Onate
sought to reserve for himself thirty square leagues of land with its
native inhabitants, as well as the right to levy from them tribute
payable in the produce of the land. In short, don Juan hoped to
establish a fiefdom directly responsible to the crown through the
Council of the Indies· and independent of viceregal control. 15
Before Onate's contract was formalized, however, don Gaspar
de Zuniga y Acevedo, Conde de Monterrey, succeeded Velasco as
viceroy. Perhaps ove~helmed by his sehse of responsibility, Monterrey saw fit to delay Onate's departure and began a series of
modifications on the original contract. Among these modifications,
designe&to put the enterprise back under the viceroy's immediate
control, Onate would be allowed to determine the amount of tribute
the Indians had to pay. However, he had to seek the advice and
approval of the royal officials and prelates of the religious orders.
All encomiendas that Onate granted had to be reported to the
crown and confirmation secured within three years. Any encomendero who took more than the amount required was liable to
lose his grant. The honor of becoming hidalgo, with privileges as
nobility of that rank enjoyed in Spain, was limited to those who
persevered in the conquest and settlement of New Mexico for five
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years. The council approved this five-year residency requirement,
but concluded that because of long distances, Onate should have
absolute freedom in allotting encomiendas, though minus a proviso
of personal service from Indians. The king, however, overruled the
last point in favor of the three-year confirmation clause. 16
Onate accepted the modifications with reservation; in fact, for
the next few years, with help from relatives in Mexico and Spain,
he pleaded his· case at court. 17 Nevertheless, after a costly and
frustrating three-year delay, the enterprise finally was under way
on 26 January 1598.
Upon ;eaching the upper Rio Grande pueblos, Onate immediately sought to confer with the caciques of each village, gain their
allegiance, and hiy the groundwork for establishment of Spanish
sovereignty. In June he chose for his headquaiters the upriver
pueblo of Caypa, which he renamed San Juan de los Caballeros,
after its inhabitants hospitably received him. Sometime later, about
1599, this capital was moved across the river to San Gabriel. By 7
July Onate had received the'submission of caciques from thirtyfour pueblos and had seen the erection of the province's first Roman
Catholic church. 18
Almost from the time of Onate's arrival, tributes were imposed
on the Indians. This imposition was carried out largely for the
colonists' survival during the first year, since in their view the
semiarid environment demanded that such action be taken. Over
the next few years Onate explored the vast reaches of his new
domain in his quest for easy wealth. Everywhere he camped the
adelantado levied tributes, sometimes forcibly, thus not always
improving Hispanic-Indian relations. 19 According to an investigation report of 1601 that don Francisco de Valverde-the royal treasurer in New Spain-made, Onate had collected "about 2,000 cotton
blankets, which ... [were] a yard and a half long and almost as
wide; 500 dressed bl,lckskins;.,five or six thousand fanegas of maize
and beans; and a ~ery small number offowls." These materials he
distributed among his colonists to help meet their needs. About
this time theadelantado had apparently begun to allot pueblos in
encomienda to his followers. Almost no records exist of now many
such grants he made, for what amounts, and to whom they were
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allotted. San Juan Pueblo seems to have been exempt from allotment because of other services rendered the Spaniards, just as the
Tlaxcalans, who aided Cortes, had received similar privileges in
central Mexico. Nevertheless, with this action, the encomienda·
system was firmly planted in New Mexico. Already Onate and his
subordinates had begun using Indian labor to cultivate their fields,
tend their livestock, and act as domestic servants. 20
Since New Mexico was isolated from the nucleus of Spain's colonial hegemony, its situation at the beginning of the seventeenth
century presented fundamental differences from sixteenth-century
Mexico. For one thing, New Mexico had no large, organized native
populations, no productive land base, and none of the basic resources of central Mexico. Money was only an indirect factor in the
frontier province's economy, a definite contrast to the cash that
sustained the economy of the fertile valley of Mexico. Instead,' the
frontier market system was based on a rather stable monetary value
assigned to various local products such as hides, pinon nuts, corn,
and other grains. 21 Such a purely subsistence economic base was
sustained by the barter of these" products, usually between individual Indians and Spanish colonists; and their accumulation and
shipment south by their political and spiritual overlords would do
nothing to stimulate local economy. Any accumulation of wealth by
permanent colonists would never be effected by banking currency
(or products) Of by investing cash in local profit-making ventures
such as cattle ranching, mining, or labor-intensive agricultural haciendas characteristic of the settled provinces farther south. Therefore, instead of the powerful political system in Mexico of the
previous century, the encomienda in New Mexico, by itself, would
become merely a resource for potential exploitation. 22
Despite Onate's apparently successful moves to establish Spanish
rule, the new colony was off to a precarious beginning. The adelantado was plagued with insubordination, mutiny, and desertions.
Even the arrival of several reinforcements to bolster the Hispanic
populace were not enough to give the settlement the strength it
needed. While the Athapascan tribes posed no real threat at this
time, the Spaniards' continued disruption of the Indian trade network would eventually lead to troubles with these nomads. Onate
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would hardly have been able to provide any defense for the missionaries and pueblos. His few belatedencomenderos spent rimch
of their time preying on Indians' homes and depriving them of food
and blankets with little thought of compensation. Indeed, many
Indians reportedly died from such cruel treatment. 23 Failing to find
easy wealth and troubled by these internal difficulties, Onate, in
1607, tendered his resignation as governor.
Even before the resignation of Onate, the viceregal authorities
in New Spain considered abandoning the province. The adelantado's resignation was sent to don Luis de Velasco, who again held
the office of viceroy. Velasco, who had considered abandoning the
province, ordered Onate to remain until the crown made a final
decision and, at the adelantado's suggestion, appointed an interim
governor. Accordingly, Capt. Juan Martinez de Montoya was named
for that position, with orders to work and consult with Onate.
Martinez, who had arrived in New Mexico with reinforcements
in December 1600, subsequently distinguished himself in campaigns against hostiles. In the fall of 1606, Onate granted him the
pueblo of Santiago de Jemez in encomienda for three generations.
At that pueblo, Martinez served as consultor and asesor for its
missionary, Fray Juan de Escalona. After he received his appointment as governor pro tempore in February 1608, the cabildo (town
council) at San Gabriel rejected him in favor of don Cristobal de
Onate, the adelantado's son. While alleging that Martinez was not
a soldier, the cabildo likely acted out ofloyalty to the Onate family.
Consequently, in the summer of 1608, Martinez was said to have
left the province. 24
Glowing reports. of successes from the Franciscan missionaries
in 1608 influenced the crown's decision to make New Mexico a
royal province, with the crown footing the expenses. Accordingly
Velasco, early the following year, appointed don.Pedro de Peralta
as royal governor of the colony. In his instructions to Peralta, the
viceroy gave him the authority to allot Indians in encomienda to
qualified individuals without prejudice to those who had already
received grants. Both Onate's and Peralta's grants were to be valid
until the king could decide on them. To enable the monarch to
make such decisions, the governor was to send a report of all
encomiendas granted, together with the qualifications and services
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of the grantees. In response to reports that tribute levied on Indians
was excessive, "causing them great vexation and trouble," Peralta
was charged to attend to the matter "proceeding in such a way as
to relieve and satisfy the royal conscience."25
After taking office, one of Peralta's first acts as governor was to
relocate the capital at a site nearer the center of the heaviest concentration of Indian population. Early in 1610, after seeking the
advice of the New Mexico veterans, Peralta seleCted the new site,
which was named La Villa'Real de la Santa Fe de San Francisco,
soon shortened to Santa Fe. Of course, Peralta made full use of
Indian labor in constructing the new villa. Often he summoned
the Indians in relays from various pueblos, some of which were a
considerable distance away. The arduous journey was hardly worth
the effort for some of the Indians, especially when they were fed
only meager rations, usually toasted corn. Fray Isidro Ordonez,
father comisario of the province, and his fellow clergymen put
pressure on the governor to improve the situation. Although Peralta
tried to lessen the abuses and to supply more food to his Indian
workers, the "poverty of the land" prevented the governor and
other Spaniards from entirely remedying the situation. As was the
case during Onate's administration, colonists apparently still depended largely on corn collected from Indians as tribute. Since
many pueblos had still not yet been granted in encomitmda, the
governor had the power to divide up the supplies gathered from
them, a point with which the friars tended to disagree. 26
The number of encomienda grants, ranging from several entire
pueblos to a fraction of one, depended on a soldier-citizen's rank
and the services he had rendered. Legally, a grant of Indians in
encomienda did not imply use of native land or labor, but rather
only the collection of tribute in kind as personal income, usually
corn and cotton mantas (blankets) or animal skins. 27 In turn, it was
the encomendero's duty to respond to the governor's call to arms,
providing his own horses and weapons, whenever the need arose.
Since there were no regular troops in seventeenth-century New
Mexico, encomenderos became the core of the local military forces.
As officers customarily designated captain by the governor, their
obligations included riding escort and serving as guards, as well as
raising militia units for the colony's security. Since all pueblos
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shared a common need for defense, Indian auxiliaries often served
in these military detachments. 28 The encomenderos' prestige, coupled with the fact that they were required to maintain residence
in Santa Fe, elevated them to dominance in the provincial government. Since their encomienda income, however small, was a
distinct advantage in the colony's limited economy, encomenderos
became something of a local aristocracy, held in some degree of
respect by less fortunate settlers. 29
However good the system looked on paper, making it work in
New Mexico was a different story. The proviso that prohibited
encomenderos from living on the tribal lands held in encomienda
was largely ignored in the distant frontier province. This violation
was especially true with encomenderos in the vicinity of the Tewa
pueblos of Nambe and Pojoaque, sometimes causing much friction
between the two groups. Also, neither encomenderos nor missionaries could interfere in the right of the Pueblos to live under
their own elected local officials. There were reports, however, of
encomenderos disrupting the lives ofIndians by interfering in local
affairs. In addition, Spanish employees ofencomenderos sometimes
intermarried with Indians and thus by degree took over Indian
lands. This practice resulted in an early absorption of scattered
Indian families all along the Rio Grande Valley.30 While some encomenderos sought to keep their blood pure, others were probably
less ethnocentric in their attitudes.
Many encomenderos acquired country estancias near the pueblos to supplement their encomienda revenues by growing wheat
and other crops and raising livestock. Fray Estevan de Perea, in
1629, reported these estancias to be abundant in herds and fruits,
"so much that from one fanega [ca. 1.5 to 2 bushels] of wheat one
hundred . . . [were] harvested. "31 As a result the encomenderos
felt that being summoned by the governor to go on long military
campaigns or to act as escort for friars going to dangerous mission
areas interfered with management of their farms and herds. Some
argued that the sole obligation of an encomendero was to attend
the cabildo at Santa Fe. 32 As the encomendero families became
more attached to the land as farmers and ranchers, land ownership
became an increasing problem. Later on, much good land and
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accessible water away from the pueblos could not be utilized because of danger from Apaches. Several outlying Pueblo groups were
thus glad to have the encomenderos living nearby for maximum
security, even though some broke the law by encroaching on tribal
communal holdings.
The question of an ecomendero living among his charges was
brought to a head during the administration of Governor Bernardo
Lopez de Mendizabal (1659-61). According to the testimony of
Capt. Antonio de Salas, encomendero of Pojoaque, the Indians had
asked him to take up residence in their pueblo. When Lopez's
predecessor, Juan de Manso, let him do so, Salas built a ranch
house and grazed an extensive herd of cattle and sheep nearby.
He claimed that his presence not only gave the Indians greater
security, but that they could get milk and wool and could work out
their tribute payments by working on his house and tending his
herds. Lopez, however, ordered Salas to raze his house and leave
the pueblo. In his suit for damages during Lopez's residencia of
1661, Salas argued that the law against encomenderos residing in
the pueblos was justified in New Spain, where peace and security
prevailed, but not so in New Mexico, where pueblos were increasingly subject to. attack by nomads. Former governors recognized
this danger, and from the beginning allowed encomenderos to live
near their charges. Salas added that his practice was common in
most of the pueblo districts. 33
Closely associated with the encomenderos' living in the pueblos
was the problem of their using the Indians as labor for selfish ends
despite laws to the contrary.34 Living near their charges meant
having a labor supply close at hand. Certainly this practice was
open to abuses, for through the encomienda system, Indians were
quickly put to work in Spanish-controlled enterprises, much as
they had been in central Mexico. 35 Lopez's action in the Salas case
was said to have been because of flagrant abuses in the latter's
household. The ranch house was not only near Pojoaque, but also
wi~hin a short distance of other Tewa pueblos in the general area.
The governor claimed that shortly after his arrival, he received
complaints from these pueblos that Salas' herds had damaged their
crops. The Indians had also suffered "vexation" at the family's hands,
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causing L6pez to arrest one of the Salas' sons and later send him
.
to the distant Moqui (Hopi) villages. 36
The governor usually had an advantage over encomenderos in
disputes since he was the only official in the province, besides the
armorer, to receive a royal salary. At the same time he had to
answer to the viceroy in the form of the residencia that each governor was required to submit at the end of his term, which usually
lasted three or four years. 37 Yet even then a governor could easily
resort to bribery to thwart justice. According to the law, governors
were prohibited from engaging in any sort of business or trade,
but this stipulation they flagrantly and openly violated. 38 Indeed,
the governor's workshops in Santa Fe hummed with the activities
of Pueblo carpenters, weavers, and craftsmen. Other Indians were
pressed into service as muleteers, drovers, and teamsters to carry
goods and herd livestock south to the markets of Parral and Santa
Barbara. Still others were sent to collect salt from saline deposits
and to gather pinon nuts in the mountains. An ambitious governor
with active cohorts could easily become a "super-encomendero"
and amass a small fortune from native goods. 39 As always, governors
exploited New Mexico's economic possibilities and exacted heavy
tribute from such "unbaptized" pueblos as Zuni and the Moqui
villages. If the Indians received any pay, it was often far below the
standard wage of half a real a day. Such actions on the part of the
governor tended to alienate him not only from the clergy, but also
from many of the encomenderos, who also suffered under these
avaricious governors.
At the same time,' some encomenderos Were just as guilty of
'exploiting their charges. At least that is what Fray Alonso de Benavides, who was appointed father custodian of New Mexico by the
Holy Office in 1629, argued. In 1630 Benavides reported that the
villa of Santa Fe was supported largely by the encomenderos of
the pueblos. Exactions of tributes and personal service from Christian Indians tended to discourage new conversions among outlying
pueblos and more so among the nomadic barbaros, who were
proving increasingly resistant to Hispanization. Each household in
converted pueblos paid an annual tribute of one manta or animal
skin,plu,s one fanega of corn. These items were collected in two
installments, in May and October. Certainly other Indians were
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loathe to assume such burdens. To minimiz~ tributes, some Pueblo
families consolidated in larger households, letting empty dwellings
crumble. To counter that .evasion, encomenderos levied tribute on
individuals instead of households, thus increasing tributes to. appalling levels.
Benavides also denounced the encomenderos' virtual enslavement of orphaned Pueblo children on pretext of charitable care.
He pointed out the Pueblo tradition of extended family households,
including grandparents, uncles, and aunts who reared children as
their own in case of the parents' deaths. In addition, the father
custodian thought that all newly converted pueblos should be exempt from tribute and personal service for a five-to-ten-year period
and that all principal Indian leaders should be permanently exempt,
as well as Indian church workers during' their tenures of service.
He urged that these reforms be adopted and that all existing laws
regarding encomiendas, particularly the five-year residency requirement, be strictly enforced. 40 .
Many historians argue that the mission and the encomienda began concurrently the task of Christianizing and Hispanicizing the
Indians, but that they. soon drew apart. Subsequently encomenderos forgot their duties, remembered only those of the Indians,
and thus caused the institution to become a black ~pot on Spain's
colonial policy.41 Actually missionaries had few serious quarrels with
encomenderos. Since they depended on each other to ensure the
colony's survivai, they reconciled themselves to joint exploitation
of their Indian charges. While the encomenderos had some military
power, they lacked legitimate means of keeping often-migratory
Pueblos from abandoning an encomienda. The missionaries, on the
other hand, had the legitimacy, but needed the encomendero's
power to hold those Indians not so easily persuaded by the Roman
Catholic presence. With the rewards of souls for the clergymen
and tributes of corn and blankets for the encomenderos, the two
factions thus had a permanent partnership. Considering the church's
power in New Mexico; especially after 1626 when the Inquisition
designated the father custodian also commissary for the Holy Office
in the province, it is likely that had the clergy and the encomenderos locked horns, the latter would have been eliminated. 42
On' a few occasions .overzealous clergymen antagonized equally

366

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 60:4

1985

zealous settlers, particularly in earlier years when missionaries moved
into new areas not yet subject to the church but already dominated
by encomenderos. However, these happenings were exceptions,
and they occurred in an environment of general accord. Most of
the antagonisms in the long, bitter, church-state conflict erupted
over the actions of transient governors and their staffs, who attempted to use the encomiendas for personal gain. 43
Much of this power struggle grew from petty quarrels over tribute-paying and the use of Indian labor. In these battles encomenderris found themselves the "middlemen," depending on which side
of the issue they stood. In the split between Father Ord6nez and
Governor Peralta, which widened over the latter's attempts to
coerce the reluctant Taos Indians to pay their annual tribute by
the use of troops, many leading Citizens sided with the clergy. Only
a few encomenderos, like Alferez Juan Escarmad, stood by Peralta.
For his efforts Escarmad was severely rebuked by the friars. When
Peralta finally ordered Ord6nez arrested for interfering in his secular actions, most of the encomenderos abandoned the governor. 44
Similar conflicts and ill will occurred during the administrations of
Juan de Eulate (1618-26) and Francisco de la Mora Ceballos (163235). When Father Benavides came as custodian in 1628, he received
testimony from prominent encomenderos charging the governor
with blasphemy, heresy, and immorality. 45
Since the governor had no real power base, his influence came
largely from his ability to form usually shaky alliances with disaffected citizens, to dispense a few fee-paying bureaucratic positions,
and to distribute a limited number of encomiendas. Any encomendero who supported the friars and incurred the governor's
wrath was in danger of losing his grant to one who was friendly to
the latter's interests. For example, don Fernando Duran y Chaves,
encomendero of San Felipe pueblo, lost and regained his inheritance three times because of his proclerical stance and consequent
troubles with governors. 46
On one occasion, during the administration of Luis de Rosas
(1637-41), this use of encomiendas as bureaucratic spoils brought
the province to the brink of civil war. Rosas, who exerted tight
control over the election of officials to the cabildo, won considerable
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notoriety for his unprovoked military expeditions against Athapascan tribes in which he sometimes took captives as slaves. When
the nomads retaliated, Rosas did nothing to protect the pueblos.
By 1604 his abuses had gone so far that many of the encomenderos
and friars gathered at Santo Domingo, the colony's ecclesiastical
headquarters, to establish a separate, dissident government. Rosas
reacted by declaring their encomiendas forfeit, seizing the tributes,
and redistributing the grants to those few who supported him.
Finally Rosas was assassinated with the help of several prominent
citizens. Indeed, by the end of his term, 73 out of 120 soldiers in
the province backed the Franciscans. 47
The viceregal authorities in Mexico, of course, took steps to mend
the scandalous situation, which had caused local rebellions among
outlying pueblos and greatly damaged the colony's economy. The
viceroy fixed the number of encomiendas in New Mexico at thirtyfive, and within that limit, the confiscated grants were restored. 48
At first the friars and encomenderos eagerly cooperated with the
new governor, Alonso Pacheco de Heredia (1642-44), in the restoration of order. But to their dismay, when Pacheco assessed the
recent rebellion, he ruled that the encomenderos had usurped
Rosas' authority for their purposes on pretext of protecting the
clergy. He subsequently had eight of them arrested and beheaded
before granting pardons to everyone else involved in the insurrection. The encomenderos, as well as the Indians and missionaries,
were further disillusioned when Pacheco mercilessly extorted higher
per capita tributes. Moreover, he was reported to have revoked
and regranted encomit'mdas in order to create lawsuits during which
he could make personal use of the encomiendas in question. 49
The governor's diplomacy, patronage, and prestige as a representative of the king and viceroy were the only pretenses of power
he could muster until about 1659, when the power of his office
began to increase. At that time, New Mexico was divided into eight
districts, or jurisdicciones, each presided over by an unsalaried
alcalde mayor the governor appointed. These appointees had petty
judicial and administrative functions but could be manipulated to
suit the governor's whims. An alcalde mayor could be either the
best friend or the worst enemy of the friars and encomenderos. 5o
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Governors also reserved the right to appoint escuderos forencomiendas that women or minors had inherited. These escuderos
received part ofthe tributes and served as active soldiers in the
place of the heirs. Certainly these appointees, too, could be used
to accomplish the governor's aims and increase his power. At the
same time, governors faced an increasingly powerful adversary in
the form of the Inquisition. In the ever-present church-state conflict, encomenderos and their holdings became more like pawns
on a political chessboard.
In 1658 Gov. Juan de Manso brought criminal charges against
two encomenderos, Capt. Francisco Anaya Almazan and his sonin-law Alonso Rodriguez. Although the nature of these charges was
unclear, Manso had the two men jailed in Santa Fe. While the
governor was gone on an inspection tour, however, they escaped
and fled to Mexico. Manso consequently banished the rest of the
family, confiscated their property, and declared their encomiendas
vacant, afterwards reassigning them to his partisans. Meanwhile
Anaya and Rodriguez won over the friendship of Manso's successor,
Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal, and accompanied his caravan to
the colony the following year. Lopez immediately sought to restore
their property and encomiendas; much to the consternation of the
Manso camp. 51 The situation soon worsened when Lopez began
arbitrarily to collect tributes from certain encomiendas to satisfy
private debts holders owed him. As part of that move, he raised
the standard half a real per day wage to a full real. He also showed
open, and sometimes violent, disrespect towards the clergy. Consequently, in 1662, the Holy Office in Mexico City ordered the
arrests of Lopez and several prominent members of his. camp.
Manso secured his revenge when he was made chief constable of
the Inquisition in New Mexico and charged with carrying out the
arrests. 52
Among those arrested and imprisoned in Santa Fe by the Inquisition was Francisco Gomez Robledo, whose numerous encomienda holdings included Cicuye (Pecos) pueblo, considered one
of the richest in New Mexico. His father, Portuguese-born Francisco Gomez, had come with Onate and had subsequently held
every office of importance in the province. Sometime before 1620
he had been awarded Cicuye in encomienda. Over the years, the
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Gomez family won a reputation as a staunch defender of royal
authority vested in the governors. Likewise, the younger Gomez
faithfully served Lopez and more than once stepped on the friars'
toes. Mter the arrests were made, Manso and the other Inquisition
officials, including Father Custodian Alonso de Posada, ordered the
alcaldes mayores to impound the holdings of Gomez and the other
imprisoned encomenderos. Posada forbade any unauthorized person to collect revenue from the prisoners' encomiendas under pain
of excommunication and a fineof five hundred pesos. 53
The new. governor, don Diego de Peiialosa, challenged Posada's
jurisdiction over the encomiendas in that matter. He hastily appointed escuderos (from his own supporters, of course) for the
impounded holdings and vigorously argued with the padre over
whether the Holy Office had right to all or part of the tributes until
the prisoners' fate was decided. Thus the church-state power struggle continued while Gomez and his companions languished in jail
and were eventually taken to Mexico City for trial. At their pueblos,
whether one represented the Holy Office or the governor, someone
was always the.re to collect the tributes of corn, animal skins, and
mantas. While Peiialosa was legally correct in appointing escuderos
in lieu of the arrested encomenderos, he undoubtedly had personal
advantage, not frontier defense, foremost in his mind. Not once
did the governor worry that he was twisting the Inquisition's tail
each time he acquired another load of goods from an embargoed
encomienda. 54
In the end, church-state con~ict became the major precipitant
of the demise of the encomienda system. Also, New Mexico in the
late seventeenth century suffered frequent droughts, which added
greatly to the Indians' hardships. Indeed, the tasks Spaniards had
imposed on Indians.left them with little time to care for their own
fields. Crop failures of cotton and corn brought added difficulties
in paying their tributes. Such impositions were especially hard on
the Tewa pueblos and on the northern and eastern peripheral villages of Taos and Cicuye, who likely obtained the bulk of their
tribute-cotton requirements through trade. While some pueblos
had been consolidated at the request of missionaries or encomenderos for indoctrination or defense purposes, famine and desperate

The mission church at Quarai, built during the 1620s and early 1630s. Now part of the Salinas
National Monument. Photo by Harvey Caplin, courtesy of the family.
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flight, along with disease, were main factors in their decline. Gradually more Pueblo Indians fled to their Athapascan neighbors to
escape the increased tributes and the governor's dangerous whims.
By the end of Governor Pacheco's term in 1644, only forty-three
pueblos in New Mexico were inhabited, a far cry from the approximately 150 at the beginning of Spanish colonization.
Apache raids, particularly after 1672·, were another reason for
the pueblos' demise. These incursions continued in frequency and
intensity despite encomenderos repeatedly taking the field with
their Indian auxiliaries. Even that move was hazardous because
the adult male populace ofcertain pueblos was so small and because
their homes were continually exposed to the raiding nomads. Likewise, the number of troops in the militia units were too few to do
much good. By 1679 the Piro and Tompiro villages east of the
Manzanos were practically abandoned, and the southern pueblos
On the Rio Grande were rapidly shrinking. 55 Encomenderos. increasingly resented being called away from their estancias to lead
lengthy campaigns at inconvenient times. While that call often
could not be helped, many soldiers regarded service at distant
places like Taos or Zuni as a form of banishment; indeed, some
governors used assignments in these areas as a means of getting
insubordinates temporarily out of their hair. 56 Because ofthe lack
of an effective military force, missionary activities among the pueblos also deteriorated, and the crown's hopes of creating a bishopric
in New Mexico were dashed.
As for the resident Spanish colonists, encomienda tributes had
a significant impact on them in terms of subsistence. These tributes
probably were an important factor in improving the colonists' lot
through their ability to accumulate and their distribution of surplus,
whenever possible, to those less fortunate. A recent scholar has
speculated that a redistribution network, based on extended kinship lines or population clusters, probably resulted from an encomendero's ability to supply periodic surplus. However, the scant
documentation of the period does not readily reveal marriage preferences, identification of kinship groups, and settlement patterns
that might show the role of individual encomenderos and their
extended kin. Nevertheless the attempts of several governors to
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confiscate certain encomenderos' tributes suggests something of
their economic ~alue. 57
At any rate excessive tributes, lack of military protection, churchstate squabbles, and overbearing governors and enco~enderos were
the main causes or'the Pueblo uprising during that fateful summer
of 1680. Although the Pueblos succeeded in driving out the Spaniards only temporarily, something they could not have done closer
to Mexico City and the viceregal authorities, the Indians scored
one important victory. Never again would they be subject to the
encomienda system. Indeed, it has been argued that had it not
been for the uprising, the more prosperous ranches might have
developed in New Mexico a settlement pattern similar to that which
subsequently'appeared in Nueva Vizcaya and other provinces to
the south, with ~he labor of dependent Indians or poor mestizos
supporting widely scattered large holdings. When Diego de Vargas
led the Reconquest of the provirice in 1692-93, he petitioned for
and received from the crown a large encomienda grant. However,
since it was never developed or put into operation-the Vargas
heirs later had the grant converted into a pension-shows that the
encomienda was, for all practical purposes, extinct. 58
As for frontier defense, the presidios in New Mexico replaced
the unsatisfactory civilian-soldier corps that the encomenderos were
compelled to man. Instead, these borderland outposts were manned
by seasoned garrisons whose salaries came from the royal treasury.
Their commanding officers were subject to the local authorities
who kept them supplied. 59
Ironically, while the encomienda system was never successful in
New Mexico, particularly among nomadic tribes,' the province's
remoteness enabled it to last longer there than in other, more
settled portions of Spain's New World empire. In many ways, New
Mexico's early colonial frontier experience paralleled that of Yucatan, in southern Mexico, whose native Mayan populace suffered
heavily under the rule of encomenderos, many of whom sought to
tum their allotments into semi-feudal estates. The key difference
was that in New Mexico such estates had not been developed
because of the more harsh, semiarid terrain. As Apache raids increased, frontier defense became a primary concern. In the end,
where the Mayans ofYucatan had failed, the Pueblos of New Mexico
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were successful. 60 Subsequently, many of the old encomendero
families who surVived the pueblo Revolt returned with Vargas to
put down permanent roots and to initiate the patron system that
has characterized New Mexico politics down to recent times. 61 Even
though the encomienda was dead and new settlement patterns had
emerged, its effects were long-lasting.
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NEWS NOTES
The Review wishes to announce several changes currently taking place with
staff members. Dr. Paul A. Hutton, formerly assistant professor at Utah State
University, assumed editorship of the New Mexico Historical Review as of 1 July
1985, and issues of the Review commencing with the January 1986 issue will carry
his name as editor. Professor Hutton, who joined the UNM history department
in August 1984 as assistant professor of U. S. frontier and military history, has
extensive editorial experience, having served as editorial assistant under Martin
Ridge at the Journal of American History and more recently as associate editor
of the Western Historical Quarterly. He is also a prolific author. His major monograph, Phil Sheridan and His Army, has just been published by the University
of Nebraska Press, and he has books forthcoming from the Southern Methodist
and University of Nebraska presses. At the same time he has contributed many
articles to scholarly and popular journals and has underway a study of the Alamo
in history and popular culture.
Richard W. Etulain, editor of the Review since 1979, will be on leave from his
teaching duties at UNM for the 1985-86 academic year. While on sabbatical,
Etulain will serve as the Hilliard Distinguished Professor of Humanities at the
University of Nevada, Reno, for the fall semester. In addition, he will also lecture
during the spring semester on the American West in India, Australia, and New
Zealand.
Lynn Brittner, editorial assistant at the New Mexico Historical Review, has
recently been awarded a National Endowment for the Arts scholarship for the fall
semester of 1985. Ms. Brittner will serve as a fellow in Museum Administration
at the Smithsonian in Washington, D. C., before returning to the University of
New Mexico where she is a graduate student in American Studies.
The University of New Mexico is pleased to announce the establishing of the
Calvin Horn Lectures on Western American History a'nd Culture. This series,
sponsored by Albuquerque businessman and educator Calvin Horn, will bring to
the UNM campus each year a well-known specialist on the American West to
deliver a series of lectures on his/her specialty. The lecturer for 1985 will be
Robert M. Utley, noted scholar and writer on frontier military and Indian topics.
His lectures, scheduled for November, will deal with the Lincoln County War.
Check with the Review office for specific details.
The Department of History, University of Texas at Arlington, announces the
1986 Webb-Smith Essay Competition with a $500 award for the best essay of
10,000 words or less on the topic "The History of North American Discovery."
The winning essay will be submitted for publication as part of volume twentyone of the Walter Prescott Webb Memorial Lecture Series that Texas A&M University Press publishes. Manuscripts for the 1986 contest must be submitted by
1 February 1986. For submittal forms and additional information, write the Walter
Prescott Memorial Lectures Committee, Department of History, Box 19529, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, Tex. 76019.

